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We report an experimental implementation of free-space quantum secure direct communication based on
single photons. The quantum communication scheme uses phase encoding, and the asymmetric Mach-Zehnder
interferometer is optimized so as to automatically compensate phase drift of the photons during their transitions
over the free-space medium. An information transmission rate of 500 bps over a 10-meter free space with a
mean quantum bit error rate of 0.49%±0.27% is achieved. The security is analyzed under the scenario that Eve
performs collective attack and photon number splitting collective attack. Our results show that quantum secure
direct communication is feasible in free space.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security and data encryption [1, 2] have risen
to a pivotal position in the digital information time. The de-
velopment of quantum communication provides us with new
approaches for secure communication tasks, with the benefit
of provable security provided by quantum mechanical laws.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol was proposed by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (called BB84 QKD protocol)
[3] to perform key exchange between legitimate distant users.
Hitherto, QKD has been well developed in optical fiber, laying
foundation for the establishment of quantum communication
networks [4]. Compared with the fiber, free-space channel is
also considered as a befitting link for quantum communica-
tion. The atmosphere has several high transmission windows
at particular wavelengths, which allows low-loss light trans-
mission. Quantum communication can be established by us-
ing a free-space channel [5] for rough areas where optical fiber
networks are not constructed. In addition, free-space quantum
communication is valuable for long-distance quantum com-
munication, combining earth-to-satellite, satellite to satellite
communications. Due to nonbirefringence for propagation of
light in atmosphere, the polarization of single-photon is main-
tained well, most free-space quantum communications are im-
plemented using polarization encoding [6–10]. QKD ensures
security through detection of eavesdropping on-site. There-
fore QKD transmits random numbers first, and if it can as-
sure no eavesdropping, the random numbers are adopted as
keys for use to encrypt the message in a subsequent classical
communication. But it cannot prevent the eavesdropper from
obtaining the transmitted ciphertext.
In the past two decades, quantum secure direct communi-
cation (QSDC) was proposed and developed [11–14]. QSDC
directly conveys safely secret messages over quantum chan-
nel. Demonstration experiments have contributed the key
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technologies of QSDC, such as frequency coding [15], quan-
tum memory [16], fiber entanglement source [17], and prac-
tical system for intra-city applications [18]. Up to now, this
philosophy has been extended to numerous different theo-
retical proposals aimed to directly convey secret information
over quantum channel, which guarantee security by ensuring
eavesdropper cannot simultaneously access to the two parts
of a correlated quantum state [11, 12, 14, 19, 20] or by en-
crypting information with quantum state [13, 21–23]. Re-
cently, the measurement-device-independent (MDI) theories
of QSDC have been established [24–26], MDI scheme for the
single-photon based QSDC was given in Ref. [24], and that
for the entanglement based QSDC protocols in Refs. [11, 12]
is provided in Ref. [25]. The scheme that is secure against all
defects in devices in QSDC, namely, the device-independent
QSDC, was given in Ref. [27].
Against the aforementioned background, our main contri-
butions are as follows. Firstly, we report a fully operational
system for free-space QSDC with phase encoding. The trans-
mitter and receiver modules are further developed by utilizing
the most common fiber optical components. A round trip op-
tical architecture can also mitigate the problem of phase drift
in the free-space channel so as to realize a stable QSDC. Sec-
ondly, the security of the QSDC system is analyzed under the
photon number splitting (PNS) collective attack, which rep-
resents a general attack strategy to multi-photon components.
The GLLP theory [28] and decoy state [29–31] can be ex-
tended into our model to analyse the security. One surprising
result is that we can achieve secure information transmission
by the two-photon component, which is consistent with the
results of two-way QKD [32–34], a special case of the DL04
QSDC protocol [13].
This paper is arranged as follows. In Section II, we re-
view the details of the single-photon based QSDC protocol
and show how we run it on a free-space experimental system
with phase encoding. In Section III, we present the experi-
mental results. In Section IV, we analyze the security of the
QSDC system. Finally, conclusions are given in Section V.
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2II. EXPERIMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION
A. Protocol
The DL04 QSDC protocol [13] realized in this work has the
following steps.
(1) Bob randomly chooses either the basis Z or X for
preparing a sequence of single photons, which are subse-
quently transmitted to Alice. Each of the photons is in one
of four quantum states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, |−〉 =
(|0〉 − |1〉)/√2}. One could implement this random selection
using a quantum random number generator [35].
(2) After receiving the photons from Bob, Alice randomly
chooses a part of photons as samples for detecting eavesdrop-
ping. For each selected photons, Alice measures them by us-
ing either the basis Z or X randomly and then announces the
positions of the sample together with the measurement basis
and outcomes. Alice and Bob obtained the detection bit error
rate (DBER) through a classical authenticated channel.
(3) If the DBER is lower than a predetermined threshold,
the information encoding process continues. Alice performs
I = |0〉〈0| + |1〉〈1| or Y = iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0| on the
rest photons to encode the secret information bit 0 or 1 and
then returns them to Bob. She will also encode some photons
randomly for error-checking. Otherwise, the communication
process is aborted.
(4) After receiving the photon sequence, Bob deterministi-
cally decodes the secret information. Bob obtains a quantum
bit error rate (QBER) by discussing with Alice on the check-
ing bits.
B. Phase encoding
The schematic of our experimental setup is shown in Fig.
1. The system is comprised of two legitimate users’ optical
setups and a free-space channel between them. The apparatus
of Alice and Bob all adopt fiber-optic components. Some low-
absorption atmospheric spectral windows in the near-infrared,
such as regions of λ~850 nm and λ~1550 nm are usually con-
sidered for free-space quantum communications. Our system
works at a wavelength of 1550 nm to take advantage of a peak
in the typical atmospheric transmission window and the low
attenuation dip in fiber-optic components.
The laser pulses are emitted at Bob with a repetition fre-
quency of 16 MHz and they are reduced to a specific atten-
uated level at the input of Bob’s station. To be more spe-
cific, Bob modulates a random phase φB1 ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}
on the pulses by using his phase modulator (PM) located in
the long-path of the asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ter. It is equivalent to the preparation of four initial states in
the DL04 QSDC protocol. The photons are transported to a
triplet fiber optic collimator (TFOC) where they are output to
a free-space channel and then collected by Alice’s collima-
tor for coupling into the single-mode fiber. In our proof-of-
principle experimental demonstration, Alice’s and Bob’s col-
limators are separated by 10 meters with 4 mirror reflections.
A 50/50 beam splitter (BS) in Alice’s system randomly re-
flects or transmits the incoming photons to two different paths:
the lower and upper path in Fig. 1, one for detecting eaves-
dropping and the other for encoding secret information. For
the lower path, Alice detects the photons with her interferom-
eter by randomly applying phase modulation φA1 ∈ {0, pi/2}
to the pulses passing over the long-path. By contrast, in the
upper path, an encoding operation I or Y is performed on the
pulses (previously passing over long-path at Bob) by adding
a phase φA2 = 0 or φ
A
2 = pi after they pass through the
Faraday rotator (FR). Finally, by the time of the pulses ar-
rive back to Bob’s station, Bob applies phase modulation φB2
to the pulses for finishing measurement according to the ini-
tial phase modulation that he has imposed. The photons are
detected by InGaAs avalanche photodiodes gated in Geiger
mode and cooled to -50 ◦C, with an efficiency of 5.57% and a
dark count probability of 1× 10−6 per gate.
In this setup, all pulses propagate over a loop with the FR
and the PM to realize information encoding. The Faraday mir-
ror in Muller’s scheme [36] is replaced by the FR. All pulses
only pass through the PM once compared with the Faraday
mirror as a reflection terminal, so this loop has less attenuation
than the original Muller’s scheme. Additionally, it will help to
improve the repetition rate of our QSDC system. The pulses
are delivered through the same optical path to convey informa-
tion, the phase is very stable, and the light propagation with
an FR automatically compensates for all polarization fluctu-
ations in the optical links. The polarization controller (PC)
located at Alice site is used to compensate polarization drift
in the fiber so that the pulses are completely transmitted at
the polarization beam splitter (PBS), guiding the short (long)
path pulse which comes from Bob into Alice’s long (short)
path. This free-space QSDC system is controlled as well as
synchronized by two field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
devices, and specific computer softwares are developed at Al-
ice’s and Bob’s terminal.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The experiment is conducted in a lab platform. Fig. 2
shows the interference fringes. Both curves are coincident
with a sinusoidal pattern. Interference visibility of single
trip (Bob-to-Alice) and round trip (Bob-to-Alice-to-Bob) is
97.37% and 99.48%, respectively. Although the light is sus-
ceptible to scatter in free-space, producing phase aberrations
which perturb quantum bits, stable interference can still be
observed in our experiment system.
To guarantee the reliable transmission of secret informa-
tion, low-density parity-check code [18, 37] is applied to our
free-space QSDC system and the compensation algorithm that
aims to eliminate phase shift of single-photon in the free-
space channel is equipped. A transmission rate of 500 bps
is obtained, consequently, files of reasonable sizes, such as
text, picture, and audio, can be transmitted directly over the
quantum channel by running our system. In the experiment
test, Alice transmits an image of size 800×525 pixels (194
k) to Bob, and Fig. 3 shows the variation of DBER and
3Figure 1. Schematic diagram of free-space QSDC system. PC, polarization controller; Att, attenuator; PBS, polarization beam splitter;
PMCIR, polarization maintaining circulator; PM, phase modulator; PMFC, polarization maintaining fiber coupler; FPGA, field-programmable
gate array; FR, Faraday rotator; BS, beamsplitter; TFOC, triplet fiber optic collimator; SPD, single-photon detector; DL, delay line. Blue,
yellow and red lines are electric line, optical fiber line and free space path respectively.
Figure 2. Interference fringe. Driving voltage from -6 V to +6 V with
a half-wave voltage 4.8 V. Singe trip interference fringe is obtained
from Alice’s detection, while the round trip one is obtained from
Bob.
QBER during the transmission time. The average of DBER
and QBER during image transmission is 1.90%±0.32% and
0.49%±0.27%, respectively. High visibility of the inter-
ferometer is crucial to obtain a low error rate in our free-
Figure 3. Error rates during image file transmission. Dashed lines
represent the mean values of DBER and dash-dotted shows the mean
values of QBER.
space QSDC system. The QBER through a round trip opti-
cal path is obtained where phase drifts are auto-compensated
by the modified Muller’s scheme, while the DBER is detected
through a single trip optical path using phase compensation
algorithm to mitigate phase shift. This active compensation is
4not as efficient as the auto-compensation, therefore DBER is
higher than QBER, as shown in Fig. 3.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The secrecy capacity lower bound of the DL04 QSDC has
given in Ref. [18] according to the Wyner’s wiretap channel
theory [38], which can be written as
Cs = max{p0}
{I(A : B)− I(A : E)} , (1)
where I(A : B) is the mutual information between Alice and
Bob, while I(A : E) is the maximum information that Eve
can steal, and p0 is the probability Alice performs operation
I during her information encoding. Hence, Cs defines the
asymptotic information rate at which Alice can convey to Bob
over quantum channel with the guarantee that Eve has negli-
gible information about the transmitted secret information.
A. Photon number splitting collective attack
The general collective attacks on single-photon have been
taken into account in many works [18, 39–41]. However,
practical quantum communication systems are usually imple-
mented with weak coherent light sources. The pulse generated
from such a light source can be written as a mixture of Fock
states ρ =
∫
(1/2pi)dθ|√µeiθ〉〈√µeiθ| = ∑n p(n, µ)|n〉〈n|,
in which the number n of photons follows the Poisson dis-
tribution p(n, µ) = e−µµn/n! with mean photon number µ
and phase θ. It occasionally emits multiple photons. Unfor-
tunately, the pulses containing multiple photons cannot be se-
cure in some quantum communication protocols when they
are under the PNS attack [29], namely, Eve splits one of the
photons from the pulses that contain two or more photons for
measuring. Here, we suggest a photon number splitting col-
lective attack according to the two-way characteristic of the
DL04 QSDC, which combines the PNS attack as well as the
collective attack. Hence, the security analysis of this system
is given in the context of both the general collective attack
on single-photon and the PNS collective attack on multiple-
photon.
The attack strategies of Eve is shown in Fig. 4. Eve has
the ability to discern the number of photons in every pulse,
then the specific attack strategies performed by Eve would be
divided into two types. On the one hand, if the pulse in the for-
ward quantum channel contains only one photon (n = 1), Eve
performs the collective attack on this photon [18, 39]. To be
more specific, Eve prepares ancilla states each of which inter-
acts individually with the photons sent from Bob to Alice, and
these ancilla states are stored in the quantum memory until the
photons are returned from Alice after secret information has
been encoded. Eve would perform the optimal measurement
by combining her ancilla states and the encoded states in order
to obtain the secret information. According to Ref. [18], the
maximum information that Eve can obtain from single-photon
is I(A : E)n=1 = h(2eBA1 ), in which we have assumed rea-
sonably that Eve introduces equivalent error rate in the X and
Z basis and eBA1 is the DBER originated from single-photon.
On the other hand, if the pulse in the forward quantum chan-
nel with photon numbers are greater than 1 (n > 1), Eve can
perform the PNS attack.
Let’s start with the case n > 3. The four linearly inde-
pendent states ({|0〉⊗n, |1〉⊗n, |+〉⊗n, |−〉⊗n}, n > 3) could
be unambiguously discriminated [42], hence there is a power-
ful attack that Eve can get all secret information for the pulse
that contains multi-photon components (n > 3) and it goes
as follows. Eve captures this pulse sent from Bob, then a new
photon in the right state that based on her successfully unam-
biguously discrimination would be prepared and transmitted
to Alice. If Eve fails to discriminate the multi-photon state,
she blocks it. After the secret information encoding is finished
by Alice, Eve captures the pulse again and she can determin-
istically decode the secret information based on the known
initial state. Consequently, the pulses with multiple photons
(n > 3) referred to as multi-photon states cannot provide se-
crecy capacity in the DL04 QSDC protocol.
Figure 4. The illustration of Eve’s attack strategies. n, the number of
photons in a pulse in the forward quantum channel; EBAµ is the error
rate of the Bob-Alice channel, which is also called as DBER; QBAµ ,
the overall signal gain of Alice; eBAdet , the erroneous signal detection
of Alice; ρBE , the joint state after Eve’s attack in the forward quan-
tum channel; QBAEµ , the overall signal gain of Eve; ρBAE , the joint
state after Alice’s information encoding and Eve’s attacks in the two
quantum channels; EBABµ is QBER; QBABµ , the overall signal gain
of Bob; eBABdet , the erroneous signal detection of Bob.
Indeed, I(A : E)n>3 = 1, and we need to derive the
secrecy capacity that two-photon components can achieve
under the PNS collective attack. In the PNS collective attack,
Eve splits one of the photons from the pulses that contain two
photons in the forward quantum channel and retains it. As for
the other photons, she applies the collective attack, as detailed
above in the case of n = 1. What is unusual is that Eve can get
two intercepted photons from each pulse, and these states will
be combined with her ancillas for the optimal measurement.
We assume that the initial state prepared by Bob is ρB =
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|+ |++〉〈++ |+ | − −〉〈− − |) /4.
Eve’s quantum operation in the PNS collective attack can be
5represented as
U |0〉B |0〉B |E〉=|0〉B |0〉B |E0000〉+ |0〉B |1〉B |E0001〉=|ϕ1〉,
U |1〉B |1〉B |E〉=|1〉B |0〉B |E1110〉+ |1〉B |1〉B |E1111〉=|ϕ2〉,
U |+〉B |+〉B |E〉=|ϕ3〉,
U |−〉B |−〉B |E〉=|ϕ4〉, (2)
where U is an unitary operation performed on two parti-
cles, i.e., one photon of ρB together with |E〉, and |E〉
(|E〉0000, |E〉0001, |E〉1110, and |E〉1111) is the ancilla state
before (after) attack. The effect of Alice’s encoding unitary
operation Y (single-particle operation) on the photons can be
written as
Y U |0〉B |0〉B |E〉=−|0〉B |1〉B |E0000〉+ |0〉B |0〉B |E0001〉
=|ϕ5〉,
Y U |1〉B |1〉B |E〉=−|1〉B |1〉B |E1110〉+ |1〉B |0〉B |E1111〉
=|ϕ6〉,
Y U |+〉B |+〉B |E〉=|ϕ7〉,
Y U |−〉B |−〉B |E〉=|ϕ8〉, (3)
Hence, after Eve’s attack, the joint state of two pho-
tons and Eve’s ancilla in the forward quantum channel is
ρBE = U (ρB ⊗ |E〉〈E|)U†. During the information en-
coding, if Alice performs unitary operation I or Y with the
probability of p0 and p1 on the photons, respectively, the
joint state would become ρ0BE = U (ρB ⊗ |E〉〈E|)U† or
ρ1BE = Y U (ρB ⊗ |E〉〈E|)U†Y † with respective probabil-
ities. Thus, the joint state that Eve can access in the backward
quantum channel is
ρBEA = p0 · ρ0BE + p1 · ρ1BE
=
1
4
(p0|ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|+ p0|ϕ2〉〈ϕ2|+ p0|ϕ3〉〈ϕ3|
+ p0|ϕ4〉〈ϕ4|+ p1|ϕ5〉〈ϕ5|+ p1|ϕ6〉〈ϕ6|
+ p1|ϕ7〉〈ϕ7|+ p1|ϕ8〉〈ϕ8|),
(4)
where p0 + p1 = 1.
The maximum information that Eve can steal I(A : E) is
given by the Holevo bound χ [41, 43], that is,
I (A : E) 6 χ
= max
{U}
{
S(ρBEA)− p0 · S(ρ0BE)− p1 · S(ρ1BE)
}
,
(5)
where S(ρ) = −Tr(ρlog2ρ) represents the von Neumann en-
tropy. On the one hand, since the density operator ρ0BE and
ρ1BE are only different in unitary operation from ρB⊗|E〉〈E|,
we can obtain that S(ρ0BE) = S(ρ
1
BE) = S(ρB ⊗ |E〉〈E|) =
3/2. On the other hand, we must obtain the eigenvalues of
the joint state ρBEA in order to calculate the von Neumann
entropy S(ρBEA). We can simplify the process of calculating
eigenvalues by using the Gram matrix representation, which
is proved to have the same eigenvalues with its correspond-
ing density operator [44]. For the joint state ρBEA, its Gram
matrix is given by
G=
1
4

p0〈ϕ1|ϕ1〉 p0〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉 · · ·√p0p1〈ϕ1|ϕ8〉
p0〈ϕ2|ϕ1〉 p0〈ϕ2|ϕ2〉 · · ·√p0p1〈ϕ2|ϕ8〉
...
...
. . .
...
√
p0p1〈ϕ8|ϕ1〉√p0p1〈ϕ8|ϕ2〉· · · p1〈ϕ8|ϕ8〉
 .
(6)
Note that the above analysis applies to the most general
PNS collective attack. To illustrate the use of the above re-
sult, we assume that Eve’s attack operator U is symmetric,
which further means that her attack could be modeled as a de-
polarizing channel [45]. The depolarizing channel is a typical
model invoked in the unconditional security proofs of some
QKD protocols, as detailed in [40, 46, 47]. Hence, in ad-
dition to the conditions of orthonormality, 〈E0000|E0000〉 +
〈E0001|E0001〉 = 1 and 〈E1110|E1110〉+ 〈E1111|E1111〉 = 1,
there are some equations of the depolarizing channel to calcu-
late the specific values of Gram matrix’s elements, which are
given as follows [18, 40]
〈E0000|E1110〉 = 〈E0001|E1111〉 = 0,
〈E0000|E0001〉 = 〈E1110|E1111〉 = 0,
〈E0001|E1110〉 = 0,
〈E0000|E1111〉 = 1− 2eBA2 , (7)
where eBA2 is the DBER caused by two-photon from Bob
to Alice. Furthermore, we assume that p0 = p1 = 1/2
[18]. After cumbersome calculations, we can get that the
eigenvalues of ρBEA are λBEA1,2 = 0, λ
BEA
3,4 = 1/4,
λBEA5,6 = (1 − 2eBA2 )/4, and λBEA7,8 = 2eBA2 /4. Therefore,
S(ρBEA) = −Tr(ρBEAlog2ρBEA) = −
∑
i λ
BEA
i log2(λ
BEA
i ) =
2+h(2e2)/2, where h(x) = −xlog2(x)− (1−x)log2(1−x)
is the binary Shannon entropy. According to Eq. (5), the max-
imum information that Eve can steal via the pulses containing
two-photon is
I(A : E)n=2 =
1
2
h(2eBA2 ) +
1
2
. (8)
One important conclusion we can draw from Eq. (8) is that the
DL04 QSDC protocol [13] has the ability to defend against
the PNS attack in the case of two-photon, since I(A : E)n=2
could be below 1. The basic physic is that, there is no basis
announcement for information decoding while basis compar-
ison is necessary for establishing the common secret keys in
the BB84 QKD [3].
B. System model
In order to analyze the practical QSDC experiment system,
let us calculate I(A : B) and I(A : E) under the frame of
Eve performing the general collective attack on single-photon
and the PNS collective attack on multi-photon, considering
the device and channel losses. Assuming that αBA, αBAE
and αBAB are the channel attenuation of different paths BA,
6BAE and BAB, respectively. As can be seen in Fig. 4, Eve
performs her eavesdropping after Alice finishing information
encoding, which indicates αBAB = 2αBA = 2αBAE . Thus,
we have the channel transmissions
tBA = 10
−
(
αBA
10
)
= tBAE = 10
−
(
αBAE
10
)
,
tBAB = 10
−
(
αBAB
10
)
, (9)
then the concomitant overall transmissions are given by
ηBA = tBAηBAopt η
A
D,
ηBAE = tBAEηBAEopt η
E
D,
ηBAB = tBABηBABopt η
B
D, (10)
where ηBAopt (η
BAE
opt and η
BAB
opt ) are the specific devices’ in-
trinsic optical losses, while ηAD, η
E
D and η
B
D are the detec-
tion efficiency of Alice, Eve and Bob, respectively. The
transmittances of n photon state through different paths are
ηBAn = 1 − (1 − ηBA)n, ηBAEn = 1 − (1 − ηBAE)n and
ηBABn = 1 − (1 − ηBAB)n. With Y A0 , Y E0 and Y B0 as back-
ground detection events of different parties, the yields become
Y An = Y
A
0 +η
BA
n −ηBAn Y A0 ≈ Y A0 +ηBAn , Y En ≈ Y E0 +ηBAEn
and Y Bn ≈ Y B0 + ηBABn , the overall signal gains and the error
rates are given by [48]:
QBAµ =
∞∑
n=0
QBAµ,n =
∞∑
n=0
p(n, µ)Y An
= Y A0 + 1− e−η
BAµ,
QBAEµ =
∞∑
n=0
QBAEµ,n =
∞∑
n=0
p(n, µ)Y En
= Y E0 + 1− e−η
BAEµ,
QBABµ =
∞∑
n=0
QBABµ,n =
∞∑
n=0
p(n, µ)Y Bn
= Y B0 + 1− e−η
BABµ, (11)
and
EBAµ =
e0Y
A
0 + e
BA
det (1− e−η
BAµ)
QBAµ
,
EBABµ =
e0Y
B
0 + e
BAB
det (1− e−η
BABµ)
QBABµ
, (12)
where e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of background, QBAµ,n (Q
BAE
µ,n
and QBABµ,n ) is the n-photon signal gain at Alice (Eve and
Bob), and eBAdet as well as e
BAB
det are intrinsic detector er-
ror rates which can be calculated by the visibilities V of
the detection system: eBAdet = (1 − V BA)/2 and eBABdet =
(1− V BAB)/2 [49].
According to the theory of binary symmertric channel and
binary erasure channel [50], the mutual information between
Alice and Bob can be calculated as
I(A : B) = QBABµ
[
1− h(EBABµ )
]
, (13)
where QBABµ is the overall signal gain of Bob after a round
trip BAB, and EBABµ is the QBER. The secret information
that Eve can obtain from single photons by using the collective
attack is [18, 39]
I(A : E)n=1 = Q
BAE
µ,n=1h(2e
BA
1 ), (14)
where eBA1 is the DBER caused by the single-photon. Given
the above, the lower bound of secrecy capacity is
Cs = Q
BAB
µ
[
1− h(EBABµ )
]−QBAEµ,n=1h(2eBA1 )
− QBAEµ,n=2[
1
2
h(2eBA2 ) +
1
2
)]−QBAEµ,n>3 · 1. (15)
Obviously, now we need to discuss how to evaluate the
DBERs in the Eq. (15) caused by single-photon (eBA1 ) and
two-photon (eBA2 ).
C. GLLP theory
There is a pessimistic assumption in the GLLP theory [28]:
all errors originate from the single-photon. Hence, the upper
bound of eBA1 is evaluated by
eBA1 =
EBAµ
1− p(n>2,µ)
QBAµ
, (16)
where EBAµ is the DBER and Q
BA
µ is the overall signal gain
at Alice’s terminal after the BA path. However, the GLLP
theory cannot give us a real value of eBA2 , in other words,
eBA2 = 0 with its assumption. In this case, I(A : E)n=2 =
QBAEµ,n=2·(1/2) according to Eq. (8) and Eq. (15), which means
Eve can obtain a part of secret information from two-photon
by the zero-DBER eavesdropping. Actually, it is a special
case of our PNS collective attack. Eve intercepts one photon
in the forward quantum channel but does nothing for the other
and forwards it directly (no error rate here, eBA2 = 0). Af-
ter Alice finishes secret information encoding, Eve intercepts
the encoded photon and combines the intercepted two photons
to read secret information. Note that the PNS attack needs
to be combined with the unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) attack [51], namely, Eve obtains information by dis-
criminating the states before and after Alice’s encoding oper-
ation, since there is no basis reconciliation in the DL04 QSDC
protocol [13]. The upper bound on the maximum probability
to discriminate two mixed states is 1/2 [52], which matches
the above-mentioned result I(A : E)n=2 = QBAEµ,n=2 · (1/2)
we have obtained under the PNS collective attack, in which
the secret information Eve may steal from two-photon is 1/2
without considering her reception rate QBAEµ,n=2.
D. Decoy state method
One way to beat the PNS attack in QKD is by utilizing de-
coy state method [29–31]. This method also can be integrated
into the DL04 QSDC [13], and we consider the decoy state
here only for detecting the PNS attack, leaving the problem
7of whether it can be used to transmit secret information for
future work. More importantly, the decoy state can provide
a better estimation of the DBER. Bob randomly uses the sig-
nal source or the decoy source to prepare the initial states and
sends them to Alice. Once these states are received by Alice,
she randomly chooses some of them to publicly discuss with
Bob for eavesdropping detection that is the same as Step (2)
in Section II II A. Bob announces where are the decoy states
and then the transmission properties of them would be tested
by Alice. It is impossible for Eve to discriminate which ones
are the decoy states, in this way, if Eve still performs the PNS
attack in the forward quantum channel, the counting rate of
the system in path of BA will be inevitably disturbed. If Al-
ice and Bob confirm that the forward quantum channel has
not been tapped, Alice will use the remaining signal states for
information encoding.
Much of the decoy-state research in the Scarani-Acin-
Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG 04) QKD protocol [53–56] has
shown how the decoy state method can be used to estimate
the error rate caused by two-photon. Inspired by these previ-
ous works, we use four decoy states: one vacuum state and
three weak decoy states (ν1, ν2, and ν3) to estimate our eBA2 ,
so that the background rate can be estimated by the vacuum
state, i.e., Y A0 = Q
BA
vac and e0 = E
BA
vac = 1/2. The upper
bound of single-photon DBER and two-photon DBER are, re-
spectively, given by [56]
eBA,U1 =
EBAν3 Q
BA
ν3 e
ν3 − e0Y A0
Y A,L1 ν3
(17)
and
eBA,U2 =
2EBAν3 Q
BA
ν3 e
ν3 − 2e0Y A0
Y A,L2 ν
2
3
, (18)
where
Y A,L1 =
µ2
(
QBAν2 e
ν2 −QBAν3 eν3
)− (ν22 − ν23) (QBAµ eµ − Y A0 )
µ2 (ν2 − ν3) (µ− ν2 − ν3) (19)
and
Y A,L2 =
2µ
(
QBAν1 e
ν1 −QBAν2 eν2
)− 2 (ν1 − ν2) (QBAµ eµ − Y A0 )
µ (ν1 − ν2) (ν1 + ν2 − µ) . (20)
Furthermore, the above mean photon numbers µ, ν1, ν2 and
ν3 meet the following conditions
0 < ν3 < ν2 6
2
3
µ < ν1 6
3
4
µ,
ν1 + ν2 > µ,
ν2 + ν3 < µ,
ν1 − ν2 − ν
3
1 − ν32
µ2
= 0. (21)
Results with explicit examples obtained from Eq. (15) are
given in Fig. 6.
E. Performance analysis
The devices’ intrinsic optical losses are measured from our
experimental setup. There is an altogether loss of 4.3 dB
from PBS and PM. The attenuation of BS and the short-arm
optical link of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer are 3.2 dB
and 2.3 dB, respectively. Then the overall device intrinsic
optical loss of Alice, Bob, and Eve are given by ηBAopt =
10−5.5/10, ηBABopt = 10
−13/10, and ηBAEopt = 10
−10.7/10, re-
spectively. The intrinsic detector error rates eBAdet = 1.31%
and eBABdet = 0.26% is deduced from system visibilities. Sup-
pose Eve’s detection efficiency is ηED = 100% and without
background detection events, while Alice and Bob utilize the
superconducting single-photon detector with detection effi-
ciency ηAD = η
B
D = 70% and background detection events
Y A0 = Y
B
0 = 8 × 10−8. We then performed numerical sim-
ulation to estimate the secrecy capacity under Eve’s attacks
with this setup in terms of maximum optical link attention.
Fig. 5 shows the secrecy capacity of the free-space QSDC
system with different mean photon numbers given by the
GLLP theory. There is a trade-off between the secrecy ca-
pacity and the maximum tolerable attenuation. The maximum
tolerable attenuation would be very small with the large mean
photon numbers, since the high multi-photon probability in
pulse and it is susceptible to the PNS attack. However, it is
infeasible to improve the maximum tolerable attenuation by
reducing the mean photon numbers drastically on account of
the decrease in the secrecy capacity. Hence, we choose the
mean photon number µ = 0.01 as the near-optimal value to
highlight performance, as its preferable performance both in
the secrecy capacity and in the maximum tolerable attenua-
tion. Consequently, as shown in Fig. 6, the channel attenua-
8Figure 5. The secrecy capacities versus the attenuation given the
collective attack as well as the PNS and USD attack under the frame-
work of GLLP analysis. The curves labeled by different markers
represent the data with different mean photon numbers.
tion of secure communication against the collective attack as
well as the PNS and USD attack for the QSDC system with
realistic devices is less than 6.5 dB.
Figure 6. Comparision of the secrecy capacities calculated by GLLP
theory and decoy state method. Simulation in the decoy state method
using µ = 0.1, ν1 = 0.07, ν2 = 0.0445, and ν3 = 0.03. In the
secrecy capacity Cs,1+2, we have considered the contribution both
from single-photon and two-photon, while Cs,1 has not considered
the contribution from two-photon. The two yellow areas represent
the contribution of two-photon to the secrecy capacity.
By contrast, as shown in Fig. 6, the secrecy capacity and
the maximum tolerable attenuation can be greatly increased
by using decoy state method. To be more specific, the secrecy
capacity is improved by an order of magnitude and the max-
imum tolerable attenuation is doubled. The results show that
the decoy state can accurately estimate the DBER caused by
single- and two-photon in which it plays a positive role in im-
proving communication performance, rather than the GLLP
theory that gives a poor estimation. As seen in Fig. 6, the
contribution of two-photon to the secrecy capacity cannot be
completely disregarded, especially when the system is oper-
ated with a comparatively higher mean photon number.
In clear weather conditions, the typical atmosphere attenu-
ation is 0.5~2 dB/km [57, 58], it is feasible to exchange secret
information by free-space QSDC based on phase-encoding for
two users over more than 1 km without using decoy state,
which is a typical distance between two terminals in a secure
area. If the decoy state method is applied, this secure com-
munication distance could be further improved. One typical
usage scenario would be applied in indoor environments for
wireless communication, known as the quantum Li-Fi system
[59].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have constructed a free-space QSDC system based on
phase encoding. The asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ters serve as transmitter and receiver with a convincing fringe
visibilities. The system can be operated to transmit text, pic-
ture, and audio, with a low average QBER of 0.49%±0.27%.
This indicates the feasibility of phase-encoding based QSDC
over a free-space channel. The security analysis of free-space
QSDC has been given under the general collective on single-
photon and the PNS collective attack on multi-photon, mak-
ing a beneficial step to calculate the secrecy capacity of QSDC
system using a practical light source. Furthermore, the PNS
collective attack is a general strategy that applicable to explain
the previous PNS plus USD attack [52]. Our results show
that the DL04 QSDC protocol is robust against the PNS at-
tack in the depolarizing channel, and the secrecy capacity is
increased significantly after considering the security of two-
photon components, especially under the framework of decoy
state. As for future investigation, decreasing the intrinsic loss
of optical setups, and optimizing the decoy state method will
be beneficial for long-distance transmission over a free-space
channel.
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